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Variation in Payment Rates under
Medicare’s Inpatient Prospective
Payment System
Sam Krinsky, AndrewM. Ryan, TodMijanovich, and Jan Blustein
Objective. To measure variation in payment rates under Medicare’s Inpatient
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and identify the main payment adjustments that
drive variation.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Medicare cost reports for all Medicare-certified hospi-
tals, 1987–2013, and Dartmouth Atlas geographic files.
StudyDesign. Wemeasure theMedicare payment rate as a hospital’s total acute inpa-
tient Medicare Part A payment, divided by the standard IPPS payment for its geo-
graphic area.We assess variation using several measures, both within local markets and
nationally.We perform a factor decomposition to identify the share of variation attribu-
table to specific adjustments. We also describe the characteristics of hospitals receiving
different payment rates and evaluate changes in the magnitude of the main adjustments
over time.
Data Collection/Extraction Methods. Data downloaded from the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the
Dartmouth Atlas.
Principal Findings. In 2013, Medicare paid for acute inpatient discharges at a rate 31
percent above the IPPS base. For the top 10 percent of discharges, the mean rate was
double the IPPS base. Variations were driven by adjustments for medical education
and care to low-income populations. The magnitude of variation has increased over
time.
Conclusions. Adjustments are a large and growing share of Medicare hospital pay-
ments, and they create significant variation in payment rates.
Key Words. Medicare, hospitals, health care costs, price variation, prospective
payment
Variation in hospital prices has been the subject of increasing interest in
recent years, attracting attention from policy analysts (Ginsburg 2010;
Reinhardt 2011; Gaynor and Town 2012), regulators (Coakley 2010; Gins-
burg 2010; Xerox 2012; Gaynor 2014), payers and advocates (Katz et al.
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2009; Delbanco 2013; Williams 2013), and the popular press (Allen et al.
2008; Brill 2013). Variations within local markets are due, at least in part,
to differences in providers’ market power, with large, specialized, or pres-
tigious hospitals receiving the highest rates (Coakley 2010; Moriya, Vogt,
and Gaynor 2010; Gaynor and Town 2012; White, Bond, and Reschovsky
2013; Delbanco 2014; Ginsburg and Pawlson 2014). Concentrated market
power is costly for patients and payers, and it may indirectly threaten the
viability and quality of care of low-cost institutions unable to compete
with well-resourced rivals (Katz et al. 2009; Berenson et al. 2012; Wil-
liams 2013).
Hospitals’ high prices have led payers to adopt several market-based
strategies to redirect patients to low-priced providers, such as reference pric-
ing, tiered benefits, and limited networks (Robinson and MacPherson 2012;
Delbanco 2013; Ginsburg and Pawlson 2014). Policy makers and analysts
have also begun reconsidering price regulation (Nichols et al. 2004; Frakt
2011; Ginsburg 2011; Reinhardt 2011; Berenson et al. 2012; Cutler and
Scott Morton 2013; Delbanco 2013; Ginsburg and Pawlson 2014; Vladeck
2014; Zimmerman 2014), with the rationale that an increased government
role in setting prices would lead to more uniformity and slower growth in
average prices. In Massachusetts, a bill under consideration would void
hospital contracts with insurers unless they fell within a narrow pricing
band, and a ballot initiative may soon bring the issue directly to voters
(McCluskey 2015).
Research has focused overwhelmingly on commercial markets, where
hospitals and insurers set prices in closed negotiations. In contrast, variations
underMedicare, where the federal government sets payment rates administra-
tively, have received little attention. Acute care hospitals are paid byMedicare
for inpatient care predominantly under the Inpatient Prospective Payment
System (IPPS). The IPPS pays hospitals based on patients’ diagnosis related
groups (DRGs), and it also compensates hospitals for exceptionally costly
patients through outlier payments. While each DRG is assigned a base price
that applies to all U.S. hospitals, hospitals receive payment adjustments
designed to account for differences in area wages, care for low-income patients
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under the disproportionate share hospitals (DSHs) program, and the indirect
costs associated with graduate medical education (IGME), among other
adjustments (Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2013; Quinn 2014).
Hospitals also receive additional payments from Medicare, the largest cover-
ing some of the direct costs for providing graduate medical education
(DGME). Many hospitals are exempt from the IPPS, though these tend to be
smaller, rural hospitals (GAO 2013; Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion [MedPAC] 2013).
Within this administrative pricing system, hospitals have limited abil-
ity to affect their payment rates, so variation is not evidence of market
power. However, this does not eliminate payment variation under Medicare
as a policy concern. For instance, Medicare payment rates can affect prices
in other markets (Frakt 2011, 2014; Clemens and Gottlieb 2013, 2014; White
2013; White and Wu 2014; Berenson et al. 2015). Separately, research by
the MedPAC and others has raised concerns that payment adjustments,
while in principle legitimate, are too large in the aggregate and poorly corre-
lated with hospitals’ resource needs (Nguyen and Sheingold 2011; Chandra,
Khullar, and Wilensky 2014; Grover, Slavin, and Willson 2014). MedPAC
found that “at most, 25 percent of the DSH payments [were] empirically jus-
tified by the higher Medicare costs at hospitals treating low-income patients”
(MedPAC 2014) and that the $6.5 billion spent annually on IGME exceeds
by $3.5 billion, the true added costs of teaching inpatient care (MedPAC
2010).
In response to these critiques, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) reduced
DSH payments by 75 percent and introduced a new uncompensated care
adjustment, beginning federal fiscal year (FY) 2014. This reform was intended
to better target safety net providers and decrease subsidies for care to low-
income populations as insurance coverage grows (Keough andWebster 2013).
Though no comparable reform has been enacted regarding Medicare’s sup-
port for graduate medical education financing, the Institute of Medicine
recently proposed significant changes (Eden, Berwick, and Wilensky 2014),
some of which were echoed in the President’s 2016 budget proposal (Office of
Management and Budget 2015). However, the policy debate concerning each
adjustment has tended to ignore how theymight interact.
To our knowledge, no prior evaluation has quantified the variation
in Medicare reimbursement resulting from all payment adjustments. We
attempt to fill this gap by assessing the magnitude of variations in
payment rates under Medicare Part A and the key policies that drive
variation.
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METHODS
Data
We used Medicare Hospital Cost Reports (versions 2552-85, 2552-89, 2552-
92, 2552-96, 2552-10) to obtain hospital-level data on Medicare payments,
discharges, and other hospital characteristics for all Medicare-certified hospi-
tals for FY 1987–2013 (Roth 2004; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices [CMS] 2015a). We also used geographic crosswalk files from the
Dartmouth Atlas (The Dartmouth Institute 2015) to match hospitals to local
service areas.
Sample
We analyzed hospitals paid under the IPPS. We excluded hospitals meeting
the key criteria for Critical Access Hospitals and Long-Term Acute Care
Hospitals (less than 25 beds or average length of stay greater than 25 days), as
these were likely to exit the IPPS over the study period. We also excluded 6
percent of cost reports due to (1) missing or inconsistent data; (2) Medicare
patient volumes that were too low to provide meaningful observations (<100
discharges/year); (3) implausible payment amounts. Further details are pro-
vided in the Appendix.
Our resulting sample for 2013 consisted of 3,212 hospitals, representing
90 percent of all Medicare Part A acute inpatient discharges. For our analysis
of variation within local hospital referral regions (HRRs), we further restricted
our sample to the 222HRRs (out of a total of 306) with at least five valid obser-
vations for FY 2013. This yielded 2,911 hospitals in FY 2013, representing 82
percent of all Part A acute inpatient discharges.
Measures
We measured Medicare payment as total Part A reimbursement to hospitals
for acute inpatient care in a FY. This measure included the standard federal
operating and capital IPPS payments, adjustments for geographic factors, all
special revenue components that are part of the IPPS (e.g., IGME, DSH), and
all other acute inpatient payments not included in the IPPS but still paid under
Part A (e.g., DGME). Because cost reports often span FYs, we made adjust-
ments to obtain consistent estimates on a FY basis. For convenience, we use
the term “Part A” to refer only to Medicare Part A acute inpatient care,
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although hospitals receive other Part A payments (e.g., for skilled nursing
units) that were not included in our measure. The Appendix provides further
detail regarding our calculation of Part A payments.
We measured the Medicare payment rate as the ratio of total Part A
reimbursement to the “base” IPPS payment the hospital would have received
absent any hospital-specific adjustments or supplement payments. In our data,
the base IPPS payment comprises payments under the standard federal oper-
ating and capital rates applicable to all IPPS hospitals, adjusted for case mix
and geographic factors. Our measure of the payment rate uses the same cost
report fields Medicare uses in settling the amounts owed to hospitals, helping
to ensure data quality.
We used several measures to describe variation in the Medicare pay-
ment rate, both within hospital referral regions and across our full sample.
Our principal method was to compare means at different quantiles of the pay-
ment rate distribution. Additionally, we calculated the Gini coefficient of the
payment rate and the “p90–p10 ratio” (i.e., the ratio of payment rates at the
90th and 10th percentiles). Throughout, we weighted by Part A discharges,
both in setting cut-points for quantiles and in tabulating summary statistics.
Thus, we interpret our results as describing the distribution of Part A dis-
charges.
For a subset of our analysis, we classified hospitals into four mutually
exclusive categories according to the type(s) of payment adjustments they
received. Categories were community (no DSH or medical education adjust-
ments), DSH (DSH adjustment, but no medical education adjustments),
teaching (medical education adjustments, but no DSH adjustment), and
DSH/teaching (adjustments for both DSH andmedical education).
Analysis
We decomposed Part A payments into seven components: operating, capital,
outlier, DSH, IGME, DGME, and “other” (see Appendix for details).1 For
each FY 1987–2013, we calculated each component’s share of Part A pay-
ments across all hospitals, and for each hospital.2 We chose this study period
because FY 1987 is the first to reflect the full phase-in of national standard base
rates under the IPPS (Guterman and Dobson 1986), and FY 2013 is the most
recent year for which complete data are available and the last before the
ACA’s main payment reforms.
To identify policies that drive variation in the Part A payment rate, for
each hospital we calculated the ratios of each of five payment components
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(outliers, DSH, IGME, DGME, other) to the hospital’s base IPPS payment
(the sum of the operating and capital components). By construction, these
ratios sum to one minus the total Part A payment rate, and we interpret them
as the percentage add-ons due to each adjustment. We calculated their means
across our full sample for FY 2013, and in several subsets, including 10 deciles
of Part A discharges (with cut-points determined by hospitals’ Part A payment
rates) and the four hospital types described above.
To compare characteristics of hospitals with high versus low adjust-
ments, we calculated statistics for several sample subsets for FY 2013. Initial
analysis revealed a large jump in mean payment rates between the highest and
second-highest deciles. For this reason, we grouped Part A discharges into the
first through fifth deciles, the sixth through ninth deciles, and the tenth decile
alone. We visualized the relationship between teaching intensity and care to
low-income populations across these three decile groups. We used the resi-
dent-to-bed ratio as our measure of teaching intensity and the DSH patient
percentage as our measure of care to low-income populations. These two fac-
tors are the major determinants of medical education and DSH payments per
discharge, respectively. The DSH patient percentage is supplemental security
income (SSI) beneficiaries’ share of Part A patient days plus the Medicaid
share of total patient days.
To measure each component’s contribution to variation in the Part A
payment rate, we performed a Gini factor decomposition, applying the
method developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). We first calculated the
Gini coefficient of Part A payment rates across our FY 2013 sample, then
decomposed this statistic into the shares of total variation contributed by each
component (see Appendix for further detail).
To measure variation within local services areas, we calculated the p90–
p10 ratio for each HRR in FY 2013 and summarized the distribution of this
statistic across HRRs.
To assess the temporal persistence of payment rates, we calculated Pear-
son correlation coefficients between hospital payment rates in three 3-year
periods in our sample (using 3-year averages to reduce year-to-year fluctua-
tions): FY 1987–1989, FY 1995–1997, and FY 2011–2013. The FY 1995–1997
period served as a natural midpoint because it occurred just before the pay-
ment reforms of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. We also calculated mean
payment rates for each decile in the national distribution and charted trends
over the study period.
For robustness, we reproduced the distribution of payment rates after
removing extreme values. We also reproduced the distribution of payment
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rates using an alternative definition of medical education payments which
excluded the amounts based on Medicare HMO patient volumes. Details are
provided in the Appendix.
RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes mean hospital characteristics for several payment rate
deciles in 2013. On average, adjustments raised Part A payment rates by 31
percent. In the top decile, average payment rates were double the IPPS base.
Discharges paid at the highest rates tended to occur in hospitals with relatively
low Medicare patient volumes, but high Medicaid. At these hospitals, HMO
patients represented a high share of the Medicare population. These hospitals
also were more likely to be large, government-owned, and located in large
urban referral regions. They had worse operating and total margins, and they
were more financially dependent on Part A adjustments than other hospitals.
Table 1 also reveals that nearly all Part A discharges occurred in hospi-
tals receiving at least some Medicare DSH, and more than half in hospitals
with at least some medical education adjustment. However, Figure 1 shows
that these binaries mask a rich heterogeneity in teaching intensities and low-
income patient shares, both overall and among hospitals with similar Part A
rates.
Figure 2 shows the 2013 distribution of payment adjustments (including
non-IPPS Part A supplements) by decile and hospital type. Hospitals that
received payment for both DSH and medical education had the highest rates
(on average 39 percent above the IPPS base); community hospitals had the
lowest (8 percent above the IPPS base). While many hospitals received rela-
tively small adjustments, there was considerable variation in the upper part of
the distribution.
Our Gini decomposition for 2013 found that the distribution of indirect
medical education was responsible for the largest share of variation in Part A
payments (36 percent), followed by DSH payments (33 percent), direct medi-
cal education payments (13 percent), “other” payments (9 percent), and outlier
payments (8 percent). Figure 2 shows that in 2013, DSH amounts increased
with each decile at a stable rate. This contrasts with medical education pay-
ments, which were negligible for the bottom half of the distribution, but
played the largest part in driving variation within the top deciles.
We also found substantial within-HRR variation in Part A payment rates
for 2013, as measured by the p90–p10 ratio and shown in Appendix Exhibit
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Table 1: Hospital Characteristics, by Part A Payment Rate, 2013
Total
Payment Rate Deciles
1–5 6–9 10
Part A rate (mean) 1.31 1.12 1.37 2.01
Adjustments (mean)
Outliers 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.11
DSH 0.14 0.07 0.17 0.33
IGME 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.37
DGME 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.13
Other 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.07
Type (%)
Community 2.5 4.4 0.6 0.1
DSH only 44.1 67.4 25.6 2.3
Teach only 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0
DSH/Teach 52.9 27.6 73.3 97.6
Payer mix (%, by IP days)
Medicare (includingHMO) 49.2 53.6 46.7 37.3
Part A 39.1 43.3 36.8 27.4
HMO 10.1 10.3 9.9 10.0
Medicaid 20.5 15.6 23.4 32.9
Teaching, DSH, and service intensity (mean)
Resident-to-bed ratio 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.58
DSH patient percentage (%) 30.3 22.2 35.4 50.1
ICU share of Part A days (%) 15.0 13.9 15.5 18.6
Control (%)
Voluntary 71.1 69.5 74.3 66.3
Proprietary 17.4 21.2 15.8 5.3
Government 11.5 9.3 9.9 28.4
Financial characteristics
Total Part A payments ($, in billions) 121.4 47.5 52.2 21.7
Share of total Part A payments (%) 100.0 39.1 43.0 17.9
Operatingmargin (median, %) 0.18 0.85 0.36 3.89
Total margin (median, %) 6.18 6.15 6.66 4.25
Part A share of net patient revenue (median, %) 18.9 19.0 19.1 17.4
Adjustments share of net patient
revenue (median, %)
3.3 2.0 4.9 8.5
Sample size
Hospitals 3,211 1,939 1,049 223
Discharges (in millions) 9.69 4.83 3.90 0.96
Other
Beds (mean) 359 251 424 637
Urban (%) 87.0 84.1 87.9 97.6
Hospitals in HRR (mean) 19 18 19 26
Notes. Characteristics as defined in text and Appendix. Calculation of operating and total margins
and shares of net patient revenue exclude observations with zero or missing values.
Source: Medicare cost reports, authors’ calculations.
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A4. In some regions, rates clustered within a narrow band: 46 percent of
HRRs had p90–p10s less than 1.3, though these tended to be smaller, account-
ing for 26 percent of discharges. At the other extreme, we observed five HRRs
with p90–p10s above 2 (5 percent of discharges). The mean p90–p10 ratio was
1.56.
Figure 3 shows how each payment component’s share of Part A
payment shifted over the study period. Base IPPS payments, defined as
the sum of operating and capital payments, decreased by 14 percentage
points, from 89 percent of total Part A payments in 1987 to 75 percent
in 2013. By contrast, the DSH share of Medicare payments increased by
9 percentage points, the combined direct and indirect graduate medical
education share by 3 percentage points, and the outlier and “other”
shares by 1 percentage point each.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
DSH Patient Percentage
Deciles 1−5 Deciles 6−9 Decile 10
Resident−to−Bed Ratio
Figure 1: Relationship between Teaching Intensity, Care to Low-Income
Populations, and Part A Payment Rates, 2013
Notes: Each marker represent a hospital. For clarity, five outlying observations representing 0.18
percent of discharges are not shown. Added lines represent the mean resident-to-bed ratio and
DSH patient percentages, respectively, weighted by Part A discharges.
Source: Medicare cost reports, authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2: Part A Payment Rates, by Payment Component, 2013
Notes: Values are the mean of Part Adischarges within each grouping.
Source:Medicare cost reports, authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4 shows the mean rates, 1987–2013, for 10 Part A payment
rate deciles. Despite some fluctuations, especially in the early years, pay-
ment rates increased steadily in all parts of the distribution. However, the
increase was greatest for the highest deciles, on both a percentage and
absolute basis.
Our test for correlation in payment rates over time at the hospital level
revealed considerable persistence, though also change over longer periods.
The correlation between hospitals’ Part A rates in 1987–1989 and 1995–1997
was 0.67. Between 1995–1997 and 2011–2013, the correlation was 0.76.
Between 1987–1989 and 2011–2013, the correlation was 0.52.
The results of our sensitivity analysis, presented in the Appendix, con-
firm our main findings. The modest differences we observe after excluding
Operating
Capital
Outliers
DSH
Ind. Med Ed
Dir. Med Ed
Other
60
70
80
90
100
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Figure 3: Percent of Aggregate Part A Payment, by Payment Component,
1987–2013
Notes: Y-axis begins at 60 percent.
Source: Medicare cost reports, authors’ calculations.
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extreme values provide reassurance that these observations did not drive our
main findings. Similarly, we found that although IGME and DGME pay-
ments for Medicare HMO discharges played a significant role in elevating
rates in the highest decile in 2013, substantial variation remained after exclud-
ing these payments.
DISCUSSION
We found that Medicare paid hospitals at rates that varied widely, even when
using a measure that was insensitive to differences in case mix or geographic
adjustments. Over the 27 years of the IPPS covered in our study, adjustments
represented a large and increasing share of Medicare expenditures for acute
inpatient care. The highest rates were paid to hospitals that received large
.75
1
1.25
1.5
1.75
2
1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Ratio of Part A Payment to IPPS Base
Figure 4: Part A Payment Rates, by Payment Decile, 1987–2013
Notes: Y-axis begins at 0.75. Vertical lines mark transitions to new cost report versions.
Source: Medicare hospital cost reports, authors’ calculations.
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payments both for DSH and medical education. Community hospitals
received the lowest rates.
Assessing Magnitudes
One way to interpret the magnitude of payment rate variation under the IPPS
is to compare it with variation in the commercial market. While comparable
national data are not available for commercial payers, data are available for
Massachusetts, where in 2009 the range ratio of commercial prices for 14
high-volume DRGs varied between 1.3 and 2.1 (Massachusetts Division of
Health Care Finance and Policy 2011).We found for the Boston referral region
in 2009, a p90–p10 ratio in the middle of that range, at 1.6.
A second point of comparison is a study of prices paid by an
autoworkers health benefit fund in 2011, spanning 13 predominantly Mid-
western metropolitan areas (White, Bond, and Reschovsky 2013. The
authors report that a case mix adjusted range ratio of 1.6 was typical for
inpatient prices among the areas studied, which is identical to the mean
of the p90–p10 ratios we observed in the corresponding referral regions
for 2011.
Explaining the Growth in Adjustments Over Time
Though a full accounting of adjustments’ increasing shares of aggregate pay-
ments is beyond the scope of our analysis, we can point to some factors that
might be responsible for the trends observed in Figure 3. Some of the
growth resulted from revisions to payment policies, via either law or agency
rulemaking. For instance, the 2003 rule change intended to decrease outlier
payments is clearly visible. But the distribution of payments between the
various components can also be affected by changes in the patient popula-
tion over time, even in the absence of policy changes. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, a hospital’s DSH payments are based largely on the share of
Medicaid and SSI beneficiaries in its patient population. The growth in these
populations translated automatically into larger DSH payments. Similarly,
since 1998, a hospital’s IGME and DGME payments under Part A have
been based, in part, on its Medicare HMO patient volume—even though it
receives no IPPS base payments for these patients. As a result, the sharp
increase in the Medicare HMO population since 2003 (The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation 2015) may explain much of the increase in these
adjustments’ shares over this period.
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Limitations
The study reflects payment rates in a subset of hospitals, capturing between 82
percent and 90 percent of Medicare Part A discharges. Smaller, rural hospitals
are underrepresented in our sample, although these hospitals are also under-
represented in the IPPS.
Our analysis does not capture all factors affecting variation in Medi-
care Part A payment rates. By design, it is insensitive to geographic adjust-
ments (including geographic reclassifications for payment purposes), and so
understates total variation in payment rates. This is most relevant for
assessing interregional variation; however, even hospitals within the same
local market may qualify for different geographic adjustments (Edmunds
and Sloan 2012). Our analysis also excludes all performance-based pay-
ments (e.g., Medicare’s Hospital Readmission Reduction or Value-Based
Purchasing programs), though these are small in magnitude and only
occurred in the tail-end of our study period. We also were not able to
directly observe the effects of the ACA’s DSH reforms, which took effect
FY 2014.
Although we have attempted to ensure that all variables were measured
accurately and consistently, some discrepancies may remain. In particular,
Medicare’s accounting guidance changes over time, as do the data elements
available in the cost reports. Some breaks in our time series may be a result of
reporting issues. Discontinuities are especially likely during CMS’s periodic
transitions to new cost report versions.
We do not provide independent assessments of hospitals’ resource needs
or variations in non-Medicare reimbursements. We also do not test what
effectsMedicare payment adjustments have had on quality of care, patient vol-
umes, market composition, price spillovers onto the commercial market,
physician supply, or other outcomes.
Anticipating the ACA’s Impact on Adjustments
The ACA reduced the operating component of Medicare DSH payments
to 25 percent of their former value and substituted in their place a new
uncompensated care payment equal to 75 percent of the DSH payments
that would have been paid absent this provision, less reductions for
increases in insurance coverage due to the ACA and additional amounts
set in legislation. Both changes took effect FY 2014. The latest CMS
projections imply that in FY 2016, the combined Medicare DSH and
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uncompensated care payments will be 73 percent of what they would have
been absent these reforms (CMS 2015b). Through the payment’s first
3 years, CMS has based each hospital’s share on the same factor used in
determining the standard DSH amount. As a result, these reforms function
more as cut to the DSH program than a change in how the funds are
targeted. A rough calculation based on our 2013 data suggests that for
hospitals in the fifth decile of Part A rates, these reforms (as implemented
through 2016) reduce the mean payment rate from 120 to 117 percent of
the IPPS base. For hospitals in the tenth decile, the reforms reduce the
mean from 201 to 192 percent.
A potentially more consequential change initiated by the ACA is the
“productivity adjustment,” which reduces the default annual rate increase
under the IPPS by an estimated 1.1 percent, in perpetuity (Shatto and Cle-
mens 2011). Although this provision affects IPPS payments across all hospi-
tals uniformly, hospitals in higher payment deciles tend to have lower
Medicare shares in their patient population, and also more non-IPPS Part A
payments (e.g., DGME). Consequently, these hospitals are less exposed to the
productivity adjustment.
Implications for Future Research
It is well known that Medicare pays elevated rates to some hospitals through
the DSH and graduate medical education programs. However, research often
obscures the magnitude of variation. For example, recent studies have used
Medicare payment as a benchmark for assessing hospital prices in the com-
mercial market (Ginsburg 2010;White, Bond, and Reschovsky 2013). We cau-
tion that unless careful attention is paid to what Medicare payments are
included in the benchmark and their variation within the sample, this
approach may produce findings that are, at best, difficult to interpret, and at
worst, misleading.
Our study underscores the need to investigate how Medicare payments
correspond to the prices paid by other payers at the hospital level. Compelling
arguments can be made that Medicare should mirror the variations found out-
side of Medicare to efficiently secure access to the full range of hospitals;
equally, it can be argued thatMedicare should compensate for these variations
to foster fairer competition and support otherwise vulnerable institutions
(Dowd et al. 2006). But it is unclear which strategy the current policy best
approximates, or how payment policy might be reformed to better meet these
objectives. Table 1 suggests that the highest rates act as an important subsidy
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for safety net providers, though Figure 1 also reveals that many hospitals
receiving elevated Medicare rates do not serve particularly low-income popu-
lations, suggesting that the current policy may reflect some of both strategies,
intentionally or otherwise. This state of affairs would be clarified if future
research were to develop a more granular understanding of how Medicare
payment rates relate to those of other payers.
Although our analysis tracks the distribution of the major payment
components across hospitals, a similar exercise could identify the policy fea-
tures most responsible for driving substantial variation within each of the
major components. In particular, the wide variation in payment rates
between hospitals with similar DSH patient percentages and resident-to-bed
ratios in Figure 1 is striking. This is due, in part, to the fact that although
DSH and medical education payments are largely determined by these fac-
tors, other hospital characteristics also play a role. For instance, each hospi-
tal’s DGME payment is based substantially on the costs it reported in FYs
1984–1985, adjusted for inflation (Eden, Berwick, and Wilensky 2014). Like-
wise, the rules for calculating the DSH adjustment allow for a number of
discontinuities, such as a ceiling of 0.12 for urban hospitals with up to 100
beds, but no ceiling for urban hospitals with 101 or more beds (Nguyen and
Sheingold 2011).
Implications for Medicare Payment Policy
The finding of wide variation in payment rates is not, in and of itself, an argu-
ment that the highest rates should be reduced. One rationale for variation is
that some patient populations have greater clinical needs than others, even
after adjusting for standard measures of case mix. For instance, because teach-
ing hospitals have reputations for clinical specialization and use of advanced
technology, they may attract cases that are more complex in subtle ways
(Newhouse 2003; American Hospital Association [AHA] 2015). Similarly,
patients at DSH hospitals may have a greater burden of illness, even condi-
tional on DRG, due to underprovision of primary care or any of the many
other aspects of poverty that adversely affect health (Kominski and Long
1997). A conceptually distinct rationale is that hospitals’ costs differ based on
their differentiated roles within the health system, and that Medicare should
adjust payment rates accordingly. The exemplary argument is that teaching
hospitals have higher costs due to the use of inexperienced residents and pro-
vision of medical research and specialized services (AHA 2015). The parallel
for DSH hospitals is a need to expend more resources when serving a
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low-income population, through greater utilization of social workers or
discharges planners (Kominski and Long 1997). Subsidies to ensure an ade-
quate supply of physicians (medical education) or hospital care in low-income
areas (DSH) can also be defended as being in the public interest.
But the IPPSwas designed to create incentives for hospitals to more effi-
ciently manage hospitalized patients. While base DRG payments are cali-
brated to reflect underlying costs of care, supplemental payments may map
poorly on to costs. As the share of base DRG payments in total Part A pay-
ments has eroded over time, so has the link between prospective payment and
hospital costs. This may have undermined the IPPS as a tool to enhance
efficiency.
Moreover, current arrangements run the risk of reinforcing operational
differences between providers, inhibiting competition. Consider the case of
graduate medical education adjustments. If, as advocates insist, the advanced
care that teaching hospitals provide would be compromised in the absence of
elevated Medicare rates, then nonteaching hospitals face a strong disincentive
to invest in the specialized services and advanced technologies necessary to
compete for the most complex cases. Even if both types of hospitals might be
able to recoup some portion of the elevated spending through higher rates in
the commercial market, the nonteaching hospital’s losses on Medicare
patients would inevitably be greater. Though rarely mentioned in the public
debate, the anticompetitive design of this policy is apparent. Certainly, com-
pelling arguments exist in favor of differentiation (e.g., to ensure efficient ser-
vice volumes, or foster innovation); nonetheless, policies that support
differentiation must also be evaluated in light of the market power they may
facilitate.
CONCLUSIONS
The large differences in payment rates documented in this study have applied
persistently for the past three decades. Plausibly, they have substantially
shaped the structure of the hospital industry and the supply of different models
of care. Given concern about the lack of competition in hospital markets, a
federal policy that provides a subset of facilities in each local area with addi-
tional resources to invest in higher levels of care should, at a minimum, war-
rant careful scrutiny. While in some circumstances elevated rates may be
essential, in others theymay actually do harm.
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NOTES
1. Originally, capital was paid based on reasonable costs, though CMS gradually tran-
sitioned to payments based on the standard federal capital IPPS rate. We include
both types of payments in our measure of the capital component.
2. For FY 2013, DSH includes some Medicare uncompensated care payment (1 per-
cent of Part A payments, in aggregate). Although Medicare uncompensated care
payments did not begin until FY 2014, some cost reports span FYs, causing these
payments to bleed into our observations for FY 2013.
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